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abstract: Based on the distinction between expressive and
instrumental motives, six theoretical mechanisms for the
formation of trust relationships are elaborated and empiri-
cally tested. When expressive motives drive tie formation,
individuals primarily attach emotional value to social
relationships. Three mechanisms have been tested: the
homophily, the balancing, and the gossiping effect. When
instrumental, control-related, motives drive tie formation,
actors strategically establish relationships because of their
potential use for the realization of material benefits or the
avoidance of material losses. Again, three mechanisms have
been tested: the signalling, the sharing group and the struc-
tural hole effect. Longitudinal data come from a sociometric
panel study of 17 members of the management team of a
German paper factory. Actor-oriented statistical modelling
shows that all effects significantly affect trust formation
separately. In a simultaneous test incorporating all six mech-
anisms, the pattern of structural holes turns out to be the
major predictor of network evolution. The implications of
structural hole theory for modelling the evolution of intra-
organizational networks are discussed.
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Introduction
The past decade has witnessed an increasing awareness of the import-
ance of trust for the functioning of teams and organizations (Kramer and
Tyler, 1996; Dirks and Ferrin, 2001; Lane and Bachmann, 2001; Nooteboom
and Six, 2003; Brass et al., 2004; for a review, see Kramer, 1999); trust is
often shown to be a substitute for more costly monitoring devices (Chiles
and McMackin, 1996; Creed and Miles, 1996; Das and Teng, 1998).
Triggered by the mounting empirical evidence on the effect of intra-
organizational trust on organizational outcomes (e.g. McAllister, 1995;
Nooteboom et al., 1997; Gould-Williams, 2003; Langfred, 2004; Reagans
et al., 2004), more and more organization scholars urge investigation of
the antecedents and determinants of intra-organizational trust (Costa et
al., 2001; Blunsdon and Reed, 2003; Bijlsma-Frankema and van de Bunt,
2003; Morrow et al., 2004; Spector and Jones, 2004), as well as the trajec-
tory of its emergence and decline (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996; Jones and
George, 1998). This literature has identified a large variety of factors and
mechanisms that contribute to the dynamics of trust in organizations,
ranging from individual attributes of team members and leaders (e.g.
tenure), characteristics of the work environment (e.g. task interdepen-
dence) and the organizational context (e.g. organizational climate).
Although the trust literature seems to be differentiated, researchers across
disciplines agree that trust is an interpersonal (i.e. dyadic) concept (for a
review, see Rousseau et al., 1998). Within the network tradition trust is
explicitly conceptualized as an interpersonal relationship, which in
general is embedded in triadic, and even more complex configurations of
relations (see, among others, Simmel, 1950; Granovetter, 1985; Burt, 1992;
Krackhardt, 1999). Furthermore, network research on trust has also shown
that it affects organizational performance and intra-organizational
dynamics (for reviews, see Krackhardt and Brass, 1994; Flap et al., 1998).
However, though considerable progress has been made with regard to
the formal modelling of social network dynamics (Snijders, 2005), still
very little seems to be known about the emergence and evolution of inter-
personal trust networks in organizations. To a large degree, this is simply
because of a lack of longitudinal intra-organizational trust network
studies. Furthermore, very little cross-fertilization has taken place so far
between organizational research on the antecedents of trust on the one
hand, and network research on the evolution of social networks (not
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necessarily trust networks) on the other hand (Zeggelink, 1993, 1994, 1995;
Zeggelink et al., 1996; van de Bunt, 1999; van de Bunt et al., 1999; Wittek,
1999, 2001; Snijders and Baerveldt, 2003). The result of this separation is
that each of the two literatures seems to rely on a different set of theor-
etical mechanisms that are invoked to explain the evolution of interper-
sonal (trust) relationships. Whereas organization researchers mostly
emphasize characteristics related to work and the control of organizations,
network scholars focus on factors that are strongly related to the social
structure itself. In this article, about trust relations in a German paper
factory, we want to make a first step in bridging this gap, by comparing
several acclaimed, though to a certain degree competing, theoretical
insights in interpersonal intra-organizational trust dynamics.
Following Dasgupta (1988), Camerer and Weigelt (1988), Coleman
(1990), Kreps (1990) and Hardin (1992, 2002), we consider trust a choice
behaviour.1 More specifically, we are interested in modelling the evolu-
tion of trust relationships, i.e. relational choices between two actors.
According to Coleman (1990), this implies that ego’s choice to trust
another actor can either be reciprocated by alter, or cannot be recipro-
cated. Similarly, ego may withdraw a trust choice in case alter ignores or
even abuses ego’s trust. Finally, in between ego’s choice to trust alter and
alter’s response there is a time lag. In other words, alter is supposed to,
or is allowed to, take his or her time before making his decision. Although
this view upon trust is often used in cross-sectional survey (network)
studies, this notion of trust, however, can only be substantiated by means
of longitudinal data on trust networks.
The article is structured as follows. In the following section, we sketch
the theoretical background and derive empirically testable hypotheses on
the evolution of intra-organizational trust relations. We then introduce the
research site, present the research design and the operationalizations of
the main concepts. In order to get detailed information about each model
separately, we discuss the results of each consecutive trust model, before
allowing all models to compete with each other in our search for the most
parsimonious collection of parameters in order to explain the develop-
ment of the trust network. Since the analyses are based on a single case,
we conclude with only a tentative discussion of our findings for research
on intra-organizational trust networks.
Theoretical Background
In what follows, we focus on six different theoretical mechanisms about
the formation of trust as they have been put forward in the literature.
They can be loosely grouped into two categories, depending on the
assumed motivational force underlying the initiation of a trust
van de Bunt et al. Intra-Organizational Trust Networks
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relationship. Here, we build on the well-established distinction between
expressive and instrumental motives for relationship formation (among
others, Lincoln and Miller, 1979; Ibarra, 1992). Expressive motives are
associated with the idea that humans attach emotional value to social
relationships. The formation of ties is therefore primarily guided by their
contribution to the social well-being of the individual, in terms of affec-
tion or the confirmation of belongingness (i.e. ‘we-ness’) needs or identi-
ties. Seen from this perspective, tie formation and dissolution occurs
independently from the potential instrumental value or material costs
following from the relationship.
Instrumental motives see trust relations as the result of strategic inter-
action and the deliberate effort of individual actors to control their
environment in order to improve their personal well-being. In organiz-
ational settings, instrumental motives are realized through formal or
informal control. In this perspective, the formation of trust relationships
is primarily guided by their potential use for the realization of material
benefits or the avoidance of material losses.
With the recent progress in the development of an action theoretic foun-
dation for social network analysis (Burt, 1982; Coleman, 1990; Lin, 2001)
and the advances in the field of actor-oriented statistical techniques for
dynamic network modelling (Snijders, 1995, 1996, 2001, 2005; van de Bunt,
1999; van de Bunt et al., 1999), new approaches have become available to
model the evolution of intra-organizational trust networks, taking into
account expressive and instrumental motivations either separately or
simultaneously. Hence, the more general question to be addressed here:
what is the relative explanatory power of theoretical trust mechanisms
building on expressive and instrumental motives, respectively?
Expressive Motives and Network Evolution: Trust and
Affection
Within the literature, three prominent theoretical mechanisms can be
distinguished that build on expressive motives. We refer to them as the
homophily effect, the balancing effect and the gossip effect.
The Homophily Effect. The homophily hypothesis is probably one of the
oldest network mechanisms that has been put forward to explain inter-
personal close ties (e.g. Festinger et al., 1950; Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1954;
Blau, 1977). It states that the more characteristics ego and alter have in
common, the more likely they will develop a close relationship. The
underlying ‘similarity–attraction’ mechanism assumes that similarity
breeds sympathy because ‘for those with similar values, then . . . social
contact, because it is rewarding, will motivate them to seek further
contact’ (Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1954: 30).
International Sociology Vol. 20 No. 3
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This homophily principle has been shown to be a very strong interper-
sonal network mechanism in a wide diversity of contexts, e.g. neighbour-
hood, community, school, work, voluntary organizations and with regard
to numerous types of informal relationships, e.g. friendship, advice, social
support and trust. We refer to McPherson et al. (2001) for an extensive
overview, which clearly shows that similarity is a driving force in the initi-
ation, maintenance and strengthening of informal relationships. Further,
Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954) make a distinction between two types of
homophily: status homophily and value homophily. The former refers to
similarity with respect to attributes such as sex, age, ethnicity, education
and occupation, whereas the latter refers to values, attitudes and beliefs.
In the present study, we follow this distinction within an organizational
context. This leads to the following hypothesis.2
Hypothesis 1: The more ego and alter are similar regarding a number of status-
and value-related characteristics, the stronger the tendency for ego to initiate
an interpersonal trust relationship to alter.
The Balancing Effect. Closely related to the homophily hypothesis is
cognitive consistency theory, although not exactly the same, also referred
to as balance theory (Heider, 1946, 1958; Newcomb, 1961), which, later
on, served as the starting point of dynamic network analysis (see, for
instance, the work of Cartwright and Harary, 1956; Davis, 1963, 1967;
Holland and Leinhardt, 1971, 1972; Hallinan, 1974; Johnsen, 1986;
Hummell and Sodeur, 1990; see Doreian et al., 1999, for a brief history of
balance theory through time). In short, dynamic balance theory states that:
(1) an asymmetric relationship will either become a mutual relationship,
or a null relationship (i.e. an asymmetric relationship is not a stable and
long-lasting state); (2) friends of my friends will become my friends.
Phrased differently, ego chooses alters having the same friends ego has.
The idea underlying the balancing argument is that actors feel uncom-
fortable in social situations in which those with whom they have a positive
relationship hold different opinions with regard to the likeability or trust-
worthiness of third parties. In order to reduce the resulting cognitive
dissonance, they are likely to change their attachments to others in the
network such that a balanced social structure is the result. The balance
argument is formalized in the following hypothesis:3
Hypothesis 2: The more ego is in balance with alter regarding third actors, the
stronger the tendency for ego to initiate an interpersonal trust relationship to
alter.
The Gossip Effect. The balancing effect points towards the importance
of third parties for the formation of ties and the subsequent evolution of
van de Bunt et al. Intra-Organizational Trust Networks
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the network. More recently, a different view on the role of third parties
for trust formation was introduced into the discussion by Burt and Knez
(1996: 83), who argue that ‘third-party gossip thus serves to reinforce
existing relations, making ego and alter more certain of their trust (or
distrust) in one another’. Similarly, Wittek and Wielers (1998) provided
empirical evidence that gossip behaviour is more likely to occur in close
relationships embedded in coalition structures, i.e. in-group ties that share
the negative evaluation of specific out-group members. This perspective
predicts that trust will be more likely to develop between gossipmongers.
The mechanism underlying this gossip effect is based on the assumption
that individuals use gossiping in order to create social solidarity and affec-
tion with specific others at the expense of negatively evaluated third
parties. Gossiping reinforces the solidarity and affection between the
gossipmonger and the recipient of the gossip. Furthermore, disclosing
private and secret information about other people can increase the status
of the gossipmonger. This results in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3a: The more ego and alter are similar with respect to gossip behav-
iour, the stronger the tendency for ego to initiate an interpersonal trust relation-
ship to alter.
Following Wittek and Wielers (1998) in their claim that gossipmongers
try to maximize status by providing not generally known information
(‘hot gossip’) about third persons to alter, we assume that ego can
maximize his or her status even more by striving after trust relationships
with popular colleagues (i.e. colleagues who are trusted by many other
colleagues) in order to get hold of the latest gossips. This results in the
next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3b: The more ego can be characterized as a gossipmonger, the
stronger the tendency for ego to initiate interpersonal trust relationships to
popular alters.
Instrumental Motives and Network Evolution: Trust
and Control
Within organizations, the need for control arises from the functional inter-
dependencies between its members: where the behaviour of an employee
or a work group has negative or positive repercussions for other
employees or the firm, those affected by these actions have a regulatory
interest to influence, monitor or sanction the actions of their fellow
workers (Heckathorn, 1990). Social networks have been identified as an
important factor in the governance of transactions between and in
organizations (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1999; Buskens et al., 2003; Bijlsma-
Frankema and Klein Woolthuis, 2005). From the point of view of this
‘embeddedness perspective’ on organizational control, interpersonal trust
International Sociology Vol. 20 No. 3
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relationships are modelled as a result of strategic and instrumental behav-
iour to manage contingencies arising from interdependencies and infor-
mation asymmetries. We refer to the three major mechanisms of
interpersonal trust formation that have been put forward within the
instrumental view as the signalling, the sharing group and the structural
hole effect, respectively.
The Signalling Effect. A key element that distinguishes formal organiz-
ations from ‘natural’ social settings is the existence of a formally legiti-
mated authority structure and the resulting hierarchy of positions and
responsibilities. As a consequence, the interventions of management need
to be taken into consideration as a potential factor influencing the evolu-
tion of intra-organizational trust networks.
Management can use different strategies of formal control to prevent
damage and stimulate intelligent effort of employees. Which strategies
are most efficient depends on the type of organizational process and work
flow patterns that have to be governed. Building on an idea by Jacobs
(1981), two types of organizational settings can be distinguished, depend-
ing on the kind of damage potential that results from the functional inter-
dependencies in the firm (Mühlau, 2000). First, in settings characterized
by disruptive damage potential, an inherent quality of the task and work
situation is that extra effort of an employee cannot lead to significant
performance improvements for the organization, whereas negligence or
shirking can have serious negative consequences. For example, in an auto-
mated production line producing a fixed number of low-complexity
goods per hour, extra effort of the worker will not lead to an increase in
productivity, whereas wrong interventions in the process by an operator
can cause costly production delays. Second, productive damage potential
is given in settings where workers’ negligence will have serious negative
consequences for the firm, but where at the same time extra effort will
significantly improve organizational performance. For example, if the
product in the previously mentioned production line example was more
complex so that extra effort by the operators would lead to an increase of
product quality and a reduction of scrap, the setting could be character-
ized as one with productive damage potential.
Scholars of organizational control have argued that firms confronted
with a high level of productive damage potential are likely to use funda-
mentally different forms of control than firms confronted with a high level
of disruptive damage potential. Where productive damage potential is
salient, firms are likely to invoke a gift exchange mechanism (Akerlof,
1982; Lindenberg, 1988; Ferrin and Dirks, 2003) to elicit the goodwill and
intelligent effort of their employees. The creation of reciprocal obligations
has been identified as a strong tool for the ex ante prevention of
van de Bunt et al. Intra-Organizational Trust Networks
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opportunistic behaviour also in organizational settings (Fox, 1974). It
entails that management continuously and consistently signals its ‘good’
intentions to the worker by investments into workers that are costly for
the firm and imply that the firm makes itself to some degree vulnerable,
because whether or not the actions will produce a payoff is at the dis-
cretion of the worker. These kinds of actions can be seen as a gift by the
worker. For example, payment of ‘efficiency wages’, investments in costly
training programmes or the procurement of other kinds of benefits that
exceed the market wage would all be indicators of this kind of signalling
behaviour. Gift giving triggers a normative orientation of the worker, who
will be inclined to reciprocate by high effort and the willingness not to
damage the firm. Thus, from a signalling perspective (see Lindenberg,
2003; two empirical applications are also provided by Costa, 2003, and
Wittek, 2003) one would expect that in organizational settings character-
ized by a high productive damage potential of workers, management
would continuously make moves signalling that it trusts employees. In
terms of interpersonal trust relations between managers and employees,
this is likely to result in an asymmetric distribution of interpersonal trust
in the manager–subordinate dyad, because management has a stronger
incentive than subordinates to actively demonstrate that it can still be
trusted.4 This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: For superiors, the tendency to trust their direct subordinate is
stronger than the tendency for subordinates to trust their direct superior.5
The Sharing Group Effect. The signalling effect specifies the gift exchange
mechanism underlying the formation of trust relationships in vertical
relationships characterized by different types of damage potential. A
similar reasoning holds for horizontal relationships. Depending on the
degree and type of functional (inter)dependence (Lindenberg, 1982; van
der Vegt, 1998), one’s peers can be a significant source of damage and/or
advantage to oneself (Costa, 2003). Sharing group theory (Lindenberg,
1982) argues that the stronger the degree of functional interdependence
between peers, the higher the need to be able to rely on each other’s
goodwill, particularly if the behaviour of the other party cannot be
constantly monitored. This implies that sharing group members have to
rely on each other, but also, that they are subject to the harmful or bene-
ficial side-effects of each other’s actions. In other words, they can, either
purposively or not, exert negative and positive externalities on each other.
Hence, in relationships in which actors are highly functionally interdepen-
dent, informal rules and solidarity norms will govern the exchanges
between the actors, resulting in the emergence of an interpersonal trust
relationship between the two. Note that this does not imply that
International Sociology Vol. 20 No. 3
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interdependence is symmetric: ego may be more dependent on alter than
vice versa. As in the case of management confronted with high produc-
tive damage potential of its employees, an employee who is unilaterally
dependent on a peer is likely to invest into the trust relationship with this
peer in order to elicit the other’s goodwill (for a detailed illustration of
this process, see Crozier’s [1964] famous description of the relationship
between the operators and the maintenance workers in a cigarette factory).
Hypothesis 5: The more ego has to depend on alter in completing his or her
tasks, the stronger the tendency for ego to initiate an interpersonal trust
relationship to alter.
The Structural Hole Effect. Burt’s (1992) widely acclaimed structural
hole theory has also implications for the evolution of intra-organizational
trust networks. A structural hole is the result of an actor being tied to at
least two other actors who are not related to each other and/or are struc-
turally equivalent. Burt argues that persons with many structural holes
occupy a brokerage position that yields information and control benefits.
They have access to more diverse information, and have the opportunity
to filter, adjust and withdraw information for their own purpose. Burt
argues further that having many structural holes strongly correlates with
having many weak ties (i.e. ties of low relational intensity or closeness).
Phrased differently, a strategic ego network consists of, in general, weak
ties to persons who are not connected to each other. If ego wants to consol-
idate his or her strategic position within the network, he or she should
not put effort into transforming weak ties into strong ones, or prevent
weak ties from becoming strong, but optimize the network by establish-
ing new relationships to actors providing access to new subsets of the
network that ego could previously not reach via the existing network.
Burt has formalized his argument on several measures, both on the indi-
vidual level, and on the dyadic level (although still from the perspective
of the individual). Assuming that persons with many structural holes (i.e.
who have an efficient network and face a low degree of dyadic constraint)
are aware of their advantageous position, this leads to the following
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 6a: The more efficient ego’s network, the less active ego is in initi-
ating interpersonal trust relationships with alters.
Hypothesis 6b: The less ego is constrained by his or her relationship with alter,
the weaker the tendency for ego to initiate an interpersonal trust relationship
with alter.
In sum, at least six key mechanisms explaining the evolution of inter-
personal trust in organizations can be discerned in the available literature
van de Bunt et al. Intra-Organizational Trust Networks
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on social network evolution and organizational control. Empirical studies
so far have usually either dealt with a single mechanism only, or have
simultaneously tested only a subset of them. To our knowledge, the six
mechanisms for the evolution of interpersonal trust relations at work have
not yet been put to test simultaneously, a task that is tackled in the follow-
ing section.
Data and Method
Investigating the different mechanisms behind the evolution of intra-
organizational trust relationships requires sociometric choice data. It also
requires a setting in which some substantial change in the interpersonal
trust ties has taken place. A data set that meets these criteria has been
collected in the context of a network panel study carried out from late
1995 until mid-1997 in a German paper factory.
Data analysis is based on sociometric information on the 17 members
of the ‘extended’ management team of the factory.6 The factory is situated
in a village with 800 inhabitants in southern Germany. When fieldwork
started in 1995, the organization had 170 employees and two paper
machines. After being declared bankrupt in 1993, the company was taken
over by a German multinational that decided to invest DM40 million on
enlarging the site with a new production hall and a third paper machine.
The latter was scheduled to be operative on 1 September 1995. During the
observation period (February 1995–July 1997), these activities before the
deadline of 1 September 1995 were the main focus at the factory.
The formal structure of the paper factory was substantially changed
twice during the observation period. This means that it is necessary to
distinguish between three phases, each with a different type of formal
structure and pattern of functional interdependence. During the first
phase, the managers had to cope with a double workload. Besides their
normal job in the daily production process, they were now also responsi-
ble for the successful realization of the common project. Mutual inter-
dependence between them and the necessity to coordinate and cooperate
reached previously unknown heights. During this phase (1995), a clear
group goal was present. With the successful completion of the project at
the end of 1995, the common group goal disappeared, although the
production department still formed a single entity. The allocation of
responsibilities concerning the new paper machine was highly ambigu-
ous. In the beginning of 1996, solving the new machine’s implementation
problems was, on the whole, considered to be a joint task. Finally, in 1997,
the production department was split up into three semi-autonomous units.
Sociometric information on interpersonal trust was collected at four
points in time, time = t1 to time = t4. Information on interpersonal trust
International Sociology Vol. 20 No. 3
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for time = t2, t3 and t4 was used as the dependent variable. They cover
the period from July 1996 to July 1997, when the major changes in the
informal relations took place. Data on job satisfaction, trust in peers and
trust in management were collected at two points in time, of which we
used those that we measured at time = t2. The task dependency structure
was measured at time = t3. Organizational members’ attributes such as
age, level of education and tenure (i.e. the number of years already
employed in the organization) were measured at time = t1. The constraint-
based measures (efficiency, dyadic constraint) are based on the communi-
cation network measured at time = t2. Finally, gossip behaviour was also
measured at time = t2.
During the whole observation period, 17 members of the management
team participated in the study. Five managers either left before time = t2,
or joined the group at time = t4. The average age was 41 (SD = 10.2), the
oldest person was 59, the youngest 28. On average they had been
employed for about 13 years (SD = 12; minimum = 1, maximum = 41) in
the paper factory. Almost 80 percent had a university degree (13 out of
17), the rest had attended higher vocational school.
Dependent Variable
The question on ‘Interpersonal Trust’ was introduced by the following text:
‘We all feel closer to particular people than to others. By “close” we mean how
much you trust somebody. For example, to whom you confide personal infor-
mation. This can include both private and work-related issues. Please indicate
for each colleague on the list which of the following descriptions best describes
your relationship with this person.’
Respondents were asked to choose one of four categories: distant,
neutral, close and very close. For the analysis the trust network has been
dichotomized: ego either trusts alter or ego has at most a neutral relation-
ship with alter.
Independent Variables
‘Interpersonal Communication’ was operationalized as follows:
‘During the past three months, how frequently did you talk during work time
to your colleagues? It doesn’t matter what you were talking about or where
the conversation took place. However, the conversation should have been more
than the transmission of a simple message or a greeting.’
Respondents could choose from a set of six categories, from several
times a day to never. In order to calculate the constraint measures, the
communication network has also been dichotomized: ego talks to alter at
least once a day, or ego talks to alter less than once a day.
van de Bunt et al. Intra-Organizational Trust Networks
349
04_bunt_055480 (jk-t)  26/7/05  8:38 am  Page 349
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on April 3, 2011iss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Following Burt (1992), the communication network is used in order to
calculate the structural hole measures, ‘efficiency’ and ‘dyadic constraint’.
Efficiency is, essentially, the number of alters minus the average degree
of alters within the ego network, not counting ties to ego, divided by the
number of alters in ego’s network (Borgatti et al., 2002). This results in a
figure higher than 0, and at most 1. Ego’s efficiency is defined according
to Burt’s proposition about redundancy by cohesion: the higher the
number of relationships between ego’s alters, the more constrained ego’s
network (i.e. the lower the efficiency of ego’s network). Dyadic constraint
is the extent to which ego is constrained by each of its alters separately
(for more details we refer to Burt, 1992).
‘Task Dependencies’ was operationalized in the following way:
‘To do our jobs we often need to cooperate more with some persons than with
others. By “cooperation” we mean those situations in which the contribution
of a colleague is important for your own work. During the past three months,
how important was for you personally cooperation with each of your
colleagues?’
Respondents had to rate this importance on a scale from 0 (played no
role) to 100 (was very important), later recoded into scores between 1
and 4.
The following individual attributes were used to determine status
homophily: age (in years), tenure (in years) and level of education
(dummy: 0 = university; 1 = higher vocational school). Furthermore, we
used the hierarchical level in the organization: actors occupying similar
positions in the social structure have to face similar opportunities and
constraints. This makes their actions more predictable than the behaviour
of people in different structural positions. Where other reliable cues about
the trustworthiness of other actors are lacking, initiating and maintaining
trust relationships to persons in similar structural positions can poten-
tially solve the information problem (Wittek, 2001: 114). Based on the
formal hierarchy, the following categorization has been constructed. It
defines the hierarchical level at which ego operates: (1) the director of the
paper factory, and those that are under the direct supervision of the
director, and supervise others (within the management team); (2) those
that are under the direct supervision of the director, but do not supervise
others (within the management team); and (3) those that are two steps
away from the director, and do not supervise others (within the manage-
ment team). Value homophily is based on the following two individual
attributes: trust in peers and trust in management. The measurements of
trust in peers and trust in management are based on nine items. Trust in
peers is measured by six items (Cronbach’s alpha is .86), and trust in
management is measured by three items (Cronbach’s alpha is .87). The
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two components explain 67 percent of the variance. The items are taken
from Cook and Wall (1980) (see Table 1). For more details, we refer to
Wittek (1999). Factor scores are used in the analyses.7
Finally, we use the gossip behaviour scale as it was developed by Wittek
and Wielers (1998). It consists of two components, one representing
positive gossip (i.e. speaking positively about the behaviour of an absent
person), the other representing negative gossip (i.e. speaking negatively
about the behaviour of an absent person). In this article, we use the
negative gossip scale. It consists of six items (see Table 2).
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Table 1 Trust in Peers and Management (Continuous Scale from ‘Fully Disagree’ to
‘Fully Agree’)
Trust in peersa
I can trust the people I work with to lend me a hand if I need it.
If I got into difficulties at work I know my workmates would try and help me
out.
Most of my colleagues get on with their work even if supervisors are not
around.
Most of my workmates can be relied upon to do as they say they will do.
I have full confidence in the skills of my colleagues.
I can rely on my colleagues not to make my job difficult by careless work.
Trust in managementb, c
Management can be trusted to make sensible decisions for the future.
Management at work seems to do an efficient job.
General management is sincere in its attempts to meet the team members’
point of view.
a Cronbach’s alpha = .86.
b Cronbach’s alpha = .87.
c Principal component analysis: in total both components explain 67 percent of the variance.
Table 2 Gossip Behaviour (10-Point Scale, Ranging from ‘Almost Never’ to ‘Almost
Always’)
Gossip behavioura
Criticizing uncooperative behaviour of an absent person.
Criticizing a negative trait or feature of an absent person.
Criticizing the passive behaviour of an absent person.
Asking the opinion of others concerning a particular behaviour of an absent
person.
Saying that they felt treated badly by an absent person.
Making fun of the behaviour of an absent person.
a Principal component analysis: one component explains 67 percent of the variance
(Cronbach’s alpha = .90).
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Actor-Oriented Modelling
The trust models are tested by means of actor-oriented statistical network
models. These models are especially designed to model the evolution of
networks through time, taking into account the network structure, indi-
vidual attributes and dyadic co-variates. Momentarily these models are
the only ones capable of dealing with such complex designs. The models
are implemented, under the name of SIENA, in the software package
StOCNET (for more information, see Snijders, 1995, 1996, 2001, 2005;
Snijders and van Duijn, 1997; van de Bunt, 1999; van de Bunt et al., 1999;
Snijders and Baerveldt, 2003; Snijders and Huisman, 2003).8 We used the
following strategy. In order to show the results of each trust model sepa-
rately, all six models are analysed one by one. Second, the three expres-
sive models (i.e. the homophily model, the structural balance model and
the gossip model) are analysed simultaneously, after which the three
instrumental models (i.e. the signalling model, the sharing group model
and the structural holes model) are also analysed simultaneously. The
final model is then estimated including the significant parameters of the
two sets of models. Finally, the concluding model consisting of the most
parsimonious collection of trust parameters is studied more thoroughly.
Results
The trust networks are shown in Figure 1.
Table 3 presents several descriptive network statistics. They show,
rather dramatically, the collapse of the trust network in between time =
t1 and time = t2. The density (i.e. the total number of relationships relative
to the total number of possible relationships among 17 persons) decreases
from 0.40 to 0.31. The degree of reciprocity (i.e. the total number of mutual
relationships relative to the total number of asymmetric and mutual
relationships) and the degree of transitivity (i.e. the total number of tran-
sitive triplets relative to the total number of triplets) drop from 0.76 to
0.47, and 0.11 to 0.05, respectively.9 As from time = t2, the trust network,
albeit rather slowly, re-establishes itself. This is shown by the small
increase of the density and the degree of reciprocity and transitivity. Next
to the ethnographic observation that an organizational event disrupted
the trust network (see Wittek, 1999), these statistics also suggest that, for
now, we should not model the whole observation period, but focus on
time = t2 to time = t4.10
The Expressive Trust Models
Table 4 shows the results of the baseline model, which only consists of
two rate parameters, λ23 and λ34, a density parameter, δ, and the reciproc-
ity effect.
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The rate parameters indicate that the estimated average number of
changes per actor from time = t2 to time = t3, and from time = t3 to time =
t4, are 5.43 and 4.86, respectively. The density effect (δ = –0.86) has no
substantial meaning: it simply corrects for the density of the network. The
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Figure 1 The Trust Network at Four Points in Time
A trust relationship from ego to alter is present if ego perceives the relationship to either be
strong or very strong.
Table 3 Trust Network Characteristics: Density, Degree of Reciprocity and the Degree
of Transitivity
Network characteristic Time = t1 Time = t2 Time = t3 Time = t4
Density 0.40 0.31 0.31 0.33
Degree of reciprocity 0.76 0.47 0.70 0.55
Degree of transitivity 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.06
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reciprocity effect shows that there is a strong tendency to establish recip-
rocal trust relationships (t = 1.15/0.22 = 5.23; p < .001).11 As is shown in
the coming models, the significance of this effect remains of approximately
the same size, regardless of other included effects. Table 5 shows the results
of the three expressive trust models, and the final expressive trust model.
The homophily test shows that, controlled for the other effects, the sizes
of the last four parameters are very small. People show no preference for
trust relationships with similar others regarding level of education, the
International Sociology Vol. 20 No. 3
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Table 4 Baseline Trust Model: Estimated Parameters of the Transition from a Neutral






Standard errors within parentheses.
* p < .05; ** p < .01.
Estimations are based on 2000 simulation runs.
Table 5 Homophily Model, Balance Model, Gossip Model and the Final Expressive
Model: Estimated Parameters of the Transition from a Neutral Trust
Relationship to a Trust Relationship
Final
Homophily Balance Gossip expressive
Parameters modela model model model
λ23 5.95 (1.02)** 5.36 (0.85)** 5.83 (0.97)** 5.85 (0.96)**
λ34 5.35 (0.97)** 4.76 (0.84)** 5.23 (0.92)** 5.25 (0.96)**
δ –0.85 (0.12)** –0.76 (0.17)** –0.87 (0.13)** –0.79 (0.15)**
Reciprocity 1.07 (0.20)** 1.13 (0.22)** 1.17 (0.21)** 1.07 (0.21)**
Tenure (in years) –0.63 (0.35)*
Age (in years) 0.90 (0.40)*
Level of education –0.03 (0.18)
Hierarchical level 0.05 (0.36)
Trust in peers 0.12 (0.45)
Trust in management –0.14 (0.34)
Structural balance 0.98 (0.49)* 0.79 (0.48)*
Gossip sim. 0.05 (0.39)
Gossip  pop. alter 1.82 (0.86)* 1.69 (0.82)*
Standard errors within parentheses.
* p < .05; ** p < .01.
Estimations are based on 2000 simulation runs. All models include the baseline model.
a Since sex is a constant (all respondents are men), it is not part of the status homophily model.
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degree of trust put in peers and management and position in the formal
hierarchy. The only two parameters that are statistically significant are the
status attributes tenure and age. The age effect points into the direction
predicted by the homophily hypothesis (t = 0.90/0.40 = 2.25; p < .05). Thus,
people have a preference to initiate interpersonal trust relations to alters
of the same age. The tenure effect, however, is in the opposite direction
as predicted by the homophily hypothesis (t = –0.63/0.35 = 1.80; p < .05).
It seems that, controlled for the other effects, the evolution of the trust
network in the paper factory is a function of tenure dissimilarity. In sum,
we did not find much support for either the status homophily or the value
homophily hypothesis.
The balancing model incorporates the strict network balance parame-
ter as discussed in a previous section. As expected, the balance effect is
positive, and statistically significant (t = 0.98/0.49 = 2.00; p < .05). This
means that actors strive after balance in their trust networks: in case both
ego and alter (do not) trust a third party, ego puts (no) trust in alter. The
findings thus support Hypothesis 2.
Table 5 also presents the gossip model. It demonstrates that gossip-
mongers show, as predicted in Hypothesis 3b, the tendency to initiate
trust relationships with popular alters within the trust network (i.e.
receive trust choices by many other actors) (t = 1.82/0.86 = 2.12; p < .05).
We did not find any proof for Hypothesis 3a: there seems to be no gossip
similarity effect.
The final expressive model is tested by means of a kind of backward
stepwise regression procedure. Initially, all significant effects (detected in
the three separate models) are part of the model. After estimation of the
model, the most non-significant effect (if any) is left out. If two effects are
of approximately the same most insignificant size, two models have been
estimated. This procedure is carried out several times. The final expres-
sive model shows that the two homophily effects, age similarity and
tenure dissimilarity, are not significant anymore. The remaining effects
(i.e. structural balance, and gossip  popularity alter) remain significant,
although the significance of both effects has become somewhat smaller.
In other words, the evolution of trust is a function of the preference for
reciprocal trust relationships (t = 1.07/0.21 = 5.10; p < .001), that are struc-
turally balanced (t = 0.79/0.48 = 1.65; p < .05). Furthermore, the more one’s
behaviour can be characterized as a gossipmonger, the stronger the
tendency to get engaged in trust relationships with popular alters (t =
1.69/0.82 = 2.06; p < .05).
The Instrumental Trust Models
Table 6 shows the results of the three instrumental models: the signalling
model, the structural holes model and the sharing group model.
van de Bunt et al. Intra-Organizational Trust Networks
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The signalling model shows that, controlled for the reciprocity effect,
superiors have the tendency to put trust in their subordinates (t = 1.23/
0.52 = 2.37; p < .01), thereby supporting Hypothesis 4. The sharing group
model tests whether the task dependency structure influences the trust
structure. The results show that the more ego is dependent on alter in
doing his or her work (i.e. the more ego is dependent on alter in carrying
out his or her daily tasks, from the perspective of ego), the more ego puts
trust in alter (t = 0.92/0.37 = 2.49; p < .01). This finding corroborates
Hypothesis 5.
The results based on the structural holes model show a positive and
significant main effect of network efficiency on interpersonal trust. This
implies that the more efficient ego’s network, the more he or she strives
to initiate interpersonal trust relationships (t = 3.44/1.39 = 2.47; p < .01).
This finding in fact contradicts Hypothesis 6a, according to which the
tendency to initiate new trust relationships should decrease the more
efficient the network of an actor is. The sign of the dyadic constraint effect
is highly significant and points to the expected direction (t = 1.09/0.22 =
4.95; p < .001), thereby confirming Hypothesis 6b. The less ego is dyadi-
cally constrained by alter, the less likely it is that ego will initiate a trust
relation to alter: a loosely constrained ego shows the tendency to not trans-
form his or her weak tie (i.e. communication) into a strong tie (i.e.
communication and trust), and might even weaken his or her relationship.
Those who are highly constrained via their relationship with alter, on the
other hand, do not try to loosen their relationships, but even strengthen
them. This suggests that the latter group strives after group closure.
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Table 6 The Instrumental Models: Estimated Parameters of the Transition from at
Most a Neutral Relationship to at Least a Strong Trust Relationship
Sharing Structural Final
Signalling group holes instrumental
Parameters model model model model
λ23 5.28 (0.94)** 5.90 (1.03)** 5.33 (0.85)** 4.77 (0.78)**
λ34 4.64 (0.91)** 5.61 (1.11)** 5.17 (0.95)** 4.68 (0.91)**
δ –1.22 (0.56)** –0.20 (0.33) –1.00 (0.19)** –0.91 (0.18)**
Reciprocity 1.05 (0.22)** 1.03 (0.22)** 1.14 (0.25)** 1.08 (0.25)**
Sup. → sub. 1.23 (0.52)**
Task dependency 0.92 (0.37)**
Dyadic constraint 1.09 (0.22)** 1.17 (0.23)**
Efficiency ego 3.44 (1.39)** 3.84 (1.77)**
Standard errors within parentheses.
*p < .05; **p < .01.
Estimations are based on 2000 simulation runs. All models include the baseline model.
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Now that all instrumental trust models control models are tested sepa-
rately, the final step is to integrate them into one statistical model in order
to test which of the aforementioned control models is statistically the most
significant. We applied the same procedure as used in determining the
final homophily model. Table 6 shows that neither the signalling model
nor the sharing group model are part of the final model. It is the struc-
tural holes explanation of the development of interpersonal trust that
yields the best results (although not completely in line with our hypothe-
ses; we come to that later). The final model also shows that controlling
for the effects of the structural holes parameters, actors show a preference
for reciprocated trust relationships. From this analysis it cannot be
concluded, however, whether the upper management and/or the lower
management belongs to either the efficient group or the inefficient group.
Given the results of the signalling model, it could be that the members of
upper management are not making their network more efficient, but
rather strive for a reallocation of trust in both the lower-level and higher-
level management in order to re-establish faith in both the upper manage-
ment and the mother organization.
Instrumental and Expressive Models Compared
In Table 7 all models are integrated into one model, so that we can
compare the relative explanatory power of the instrumental and the
expressive models. As before, we used the same procedure as in deter-
mining the final expressive and instrumental trust model.
The final model shows that, again, structural hole theory seems to be
the best predictor of the evolution of the trust network: individuals will
not intensify their ties to persons who exert little structural constraint on
them, and they will tend to initiate more trust relations the more efficient
their network is. In sum, it seems that people strive after reciprocal trust
relationships, and try to optimize their position within the network (i.e.
search for the right mix of strong and weak ties).
As said, the final model only consists of structural holes effects. In order
to get a more detailed picture of the effects in the final model, we add
three new parameters. To compare the creation and termination of a tie
to a constraining alter, we add what we call the ‘breaking constraining
tie’ parameter. For reasons of clarification, suppose that the dyadic
constraint effect of alter on ego is either 0 (no constraints imposed by alter
on ego) or 1 (maximal constraints imposed by alter on ego). Table 7 then
shows that, controlled for all other effects, the effect of creating a tie with
a maximally constraining alter is 0.65, whereas the total effect of breaking
a tie with such an alter is –0.65 – 1.06 = –1.71. In other words, it seems
that actors are more eager to dissolve a trust relation with a constraining
alter, than to initiate a trust relation with a constraining alter.
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The remaining two parameters we added to the model are the
‘efficiency similarity’ effect (i.e. the tendency to get engaged in trust
relationships with equally efficient alters) and the main effect of alter’s
efficiency. To interpret the three efficiency effects, we consider them simul-
taneously. Since efficiency is a continuous variable, we only present the
four extremes. The resulting effects are presented in Table 8.
The joint effect of the efficiency-related parameters carefully worded
suggests that actors with an inefficient network (i.e. low number of struc-
tural holes) neither trust alters with an efficient (an effect of –2.63) or (to
a somewhat lesser degree) an inefficient network (–1.71). Actors with an
efficient network trust alters with an inefficient network (2.03) and to a
lesser degree alters with an efficient network (0.83). Put differently, actors
with relatively many structural holes tend to increase their number of
close relationships by initiating relationships with alters poor in structural
holes, whereas actors relatively poor in structural holes seem to reduce
their number of close relationships by terminating relationships with
International Sociology Vol. 20 No. 3
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Table 7 The Final Trust Model:a Estimated Parameters of the Transition from at Most a
Neutral Relationship to at Least a Strong Trust Relationship
Final trust Elaborated final
Parameters model Parameters trust model
λ23 5.68 (0.92) λ23 5.94 (1.02)**
λ34 5.56 (1.02) λ34 5.95 (1.06)**
δ –0.99 (0.14) δ –1.02 (0.15)**
Reciprocity 1.10 (0.22) Reciprocity 1.23 (0.25)**
Dyadic constraint 1.07 (0.18)** Dyadic constraint 0.65 (0.27)**
Breaking constraining tie –0.97 (0.58)*
Efficiency ego 3.13 (1.30)** Efficiency similarity –0.14 (0.61)
Efficiency alter –1.06 (0.92)
Efficiency ego 3.60 (1.27)**
a Except for the structural holes effects, all effects are non-significant.
Standard errors within parentheses.
*p < .05; **p < .01.
Estimations are based on 2000 simulation runs. All models include the baseline model.
Table 8 Network Efficiency: The Combined Estimated Effects Based on the Network
Efficiency of Ego and Alter, and the Efficiency Similarity Effect
Minimally efficient Maximally efficient
network network
Minimally efficient network –1.71 –2.63
Maximally efficient network 2.03 0.83
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alters rich in structural holes. We come back to the structural holes
discussion in the concluding section.
Discussion and Conclusion
We distinguish two types of motives as a driving force behind network
evolution: expressive and instrumental motives. Many models of evolu-
tion of intra-organizational networks were dominated by the idea that
relational dynamics are driven first and foremost by expressive motives,
with homophily considerations and the reduction of cognitive dissonance
in affective triads providing the major mechanisms for relationship forma-
tion. Individual cognitions or attributes are the prime movers behind
network evolution.
Others have suggested paying more attention to the possible instru-
mental motives behind the formation of interpersonal trust relationships
in organizational settings. Their argument was that work settings generate
specific constraints on the formation of social ties, which can counteract
or neutralize the mechanisms underlying the evolution of networks in
natural groups. Within this perspective, two different arguments were
elaborated.
The first line of reasoning emphasizes the impact of formal organiz-
ational structures, in particular functional interdependencies on the one
hand, and the formal control strategies associated with the hierarchical
position of actors. Here, interpersonal trust is modelled as a function of
formally defined patterns of interdependence and power. Individuals
adapt to their formal work environment, they manage critical dependen-
cies by embedding them into social exchanges. The dynamics of the
informal network are contingent upon the formal organizational struc-
ture.
In the second line of instrumental reasoning, interpersonal trust
relationships are the result of individual actors who actively try to
optimize the benefits that their personal networks can generate – inde-
pendently of the actor’s position in the formal structure. In this perspec-
tive, individuals benefit from occupying brokerage positions, and
therefore will try to change their network structure to increase their
brokerage opportunities.
In sum, the three approaches emphasize either the importance of indi-
vidual cognitions or attributes, the force of organizational contingencies,
or the power of individual strategic motives as the major determinant of
network evolution. From these approaches, we derived six effects divided
in two groups: expressive and instrumental motives to trust.
Our results indicate that when tested separately, five of the six factors
significantly affect the evolution of interpersonal trust. The only factor
van de Bunt et al. Intra-Organizational Trust Networks
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that only partly produced significant results was the variables related to
the homophily effect with respect to age, and tenure. The latter effect was
even found to be in the opposite direction as predicted. These findings
therefore support the idea that both expressive and instrumental motives
drive the evolution of trust networks, and they indicate that also the mech-
anisms that have been introduced into the literature more recently and
emphasize organizational contingencies or individual strategic behaviour
are a fruitful and necessary extension of the literature on network evolu-
tion.
Our analysis showed further that when tested simultaneously, the six
effects vary considerably in terms of their relative explanatory power. In
the company under investigation, the major predictors for the initiation
of interpersonal trust relationship between two actors are related to their
structural holes. Thus, brokerage benefits seem to be a better predictor of
network evolution in this management team than the mechanisms spec-
ified in the homophily, balancing, gossip, signalling or sharing expla-
nations. That is, if this mechanism is taken into consideration, the other
mechanisms lose their impact and become insignificant.
Though structural hole theory has generated a considerable body of
insightful studies since its full elaboration more than a decade ago (Burt,
1992), until now not much attention has been paid to its potential impli-
cations for the evolution of networks. Both efficiency of the network and
dyadic constraint turned out to be strong predictors for the initiation of
interpersonal trust relationships – though having a highly efficient
network in Burt’s sense, contrary to our hypothesis, tends to increase an
actor’s efforts to initiate more additional ties. When viewed in the light
of the positive effect of dyadic constraint on trust formation, one carefully
formulated conclusion to be drawn from this finding might be that actors
with a relatively efficient network and little dyadic constraint will initiate
new trust relationships with those new parts of the network to which they
do not yet have access. This interpretation would be in line with struc-
tural hole theory. It also highlights the entrepreneurial qualities Burt
associates with individuals in broker positions (Burt et al., 1998).
A possible alternative explanation could be given by Simmelian tie
theory, which partly opposes structural hole theory:
Burt’s primary emphasis is on whether a person’s ties to a set of alters are tied
to each other; the more the alters are tied to each other, the more constraint is
placed on ego. Simmelian tie theory, on the other hand, cares not only about
such ties but whether a person is embedded in cliques; the more cliques one
is embedded in, the more constrained the person is. (Krackhardt, 1999: 190)
Thus, due to their strategic position (i.e. a boundary spanning position
crossing structural holes), actors with efficient networks are subject to
International Sociology Vol. 20 No. 3
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constraints as described in Simmelian tie theory; boundary spanners have
to meet several, often different sets of group norms. Loosely interpreted,
Simmelian tie theory would predict that such persons are constrained in
their behaviour, and therefore will probably refrain from transforming
their weak ties into strong ties. This is not different from what structural
hole theory predicts. Highly inefficient actors (in Burt’s terminology), on
the other hand, only have to meet the norms of one group. They may stick
to their own highly tied group with its specific norms and rules; peer
pressure could keep group members from starting new trust relationships
(see also Nooteboom, 2003) with outsiders. According to Simmelian tie
theory, they will probably intensify relationships within their own group.
This prediction partly differs from structural hole theory, which would
predict that inefficient actors who are aware of their inefficient positions
should optimize their positions by initializing relationships outside their
own group. To see whether this alternative explanation is supported by
the data, we carried out some additional analyses on the evolution of the
trust network of the management team of the paper factory. The results
(not shown) support Simmelian tie theory: the more cliques ego belongs
to, the less likely it is that ego will initiate trust relationships to new alters,
unless ego and alter are strongly tied to each other by both being member
of the same cliques.
Before discussing the implications of these findings for future research,
we want to indicate some methodological limitations of our study. First
of all, the results are built upon one single case, the management team of
a German paper factory, consisting of relatively few persons. Second, our
operationalization of status and value homophily might have been based
on suboptimal attributes, in the sense that they are not the main attrib-
utes to identify the homophily effect. Third, the task dependency struc-
ture is measured at time = t3. Although we have reasons to assume that
this structure is relatively constant over time, at least during the period
from time = t2 to time = t3 (we refer to the section about the paper factory
for more details), we only have observational but no statistical proof that
this is indeed the case. Fourth, gossip behaviour is not operationalized in
terms of individual gossip behaviour, but on the perception of gossip
within the organization. Although we treat this perception as a proxy for
the manifestation of individual gossip behaviour, it is not precisely the
same. Future studies could certainly benefit from a better measurement
of gossip behaviour and the dependency structure. Finally, although
actor-oriented models are the best yet available to model the evolution of
social networks, it still lacks several important features; it is not yet
possible to model changing dyadic co-variates, the construction of
goodness of fit tests has only started recently and multiplexity problems
cannot be tackled yet.
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The findings have some interesting implications for the future study of
the formation of intra-organizational trust networks. First, rather statically
formulated hypotheses, such as the similarity hypotheses and the task
dependency hypothesis, can easily be extended to explain the evolution of
interpersonal trust networks. In general, our future goal is to define under
which circumstances, which trust mechanism performs better, as either
being a static, or a dynamic explanation of the formation of interpersonal
trust. In particular, the differences between structural hole theory and
Simmelian tie theory in relation to the evolution of intra-organizational
trust networks should be investigated in far more detail. The conditions
under which structural hole theory operates in favour of Simmelian tie
theory, and vice versa, is a relatively unexplored area or research, and might
shed more light on the trust problem. Second, although we treated all
control mechanisms as being equally important, it could well be that
specific characteristics of the organization under study should be incorpor-
ated into the analysis. Our future aim is to define the conditions under
which either of the trust–control mechanisms should theoretically play a
relatively more important role. Our finding that structural hole theory was
the best predictor could for instance be because of the actual organization
under study. Within the higher management of an organization, strategic
choices might be more likely to occur than among blue-collar employees
of some other organization. Third, as already mentioned in the section on
the methodological drawbacks, attributes that define status and value
homophily might be context dependent. Another future aim is to define
under which conditions which individual attributes play a role, and, con-
sequently, serve either as similarity or dissimilarity constituents of trust.
Notes
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Organization for Scientific Research (Grant number 016.005.052) for the work
reported in this article.
1. See Kramer (1999) to see how trust as choice behaviour is positioned within
the trust research tradition, and how it contrasts trust as a psychological state.
2. All hypotheses are expressed from the perspective of ego.
3. The reciprocity hypothesis is not unique for structural balance theory. Norms
of reciprocity are universially accepted. Without sometimes even referring to
the tendency to get engaged in mutual trust relationships, each of the discussed
theoretical trust mechanisms implicitly assumes reciprocity. Therefore, the
reciprocity effect is part of our baseline model (see the Results section).
4. See Den Hartog (2003) for a study on the trust relationship between super-
visor and subordinates, conditional on the type of leadership employed by
the supervisor.
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5. Our operationalization of trust is in terms of confiding private and work-
related information. Although it is often found that superiors do not talk about
private matters with their subordinates, we assume that this does not hold in
this specific case study about a management team.
6. Within the factory, a distinction is made between a ‘core’ and an ‘extended’
management team. The core of the management team consisted of the COO
(chief operations officer), his or her assistant and the heads of the production,
maintenance, logistics, personnel, controlling, and project departments (eight
persons). The ‘extended management team’ also comprised junior engineers
reporting to the department heads.
7. The present network study was part of a larger network research project in
five organizations. Core questions were asked in all organizations. The factor
analysis was performed on the data of all organizations (in total the sample
size was approximately 200).
8. StOCNET can be dowloaded from Snijders’ homepage; at: stat.gamma.rug.nl/
snijders
9. Because of the still numerous present trust relationships, Figure 1 does not
show as clearly as Table 3 the collapse of the trust network in between time
= t1 and time = t2. Figures based on only the very strong trust relationships,
would have shown this decrease.
10. For more details about density, reciprocity, transitivity and other common
network characteristics we refer to Scott (1991), Wasserman and Faust (1994)
and Degenne and Forsé (1999).
11. All parameters are tested one-sidedly.
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